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Courage
“Courage wants to laugh.”1
 Friedrich Nietzsche
I: Contemporary Aristotelian Republicanism
Why courage? Why should this concept still be relevant today? Why should one 
again bother to (re-)think it? One is immediately confronted with these ques-
tions when invoking the concept of courage today. Any project that seeks to 
return to or even revitalise courage (for) today might immediately appear to 
be peculiarly misplaced, anachronistic, and outdated, as if it speaks from a 
different time. The concept or, even worse, the virtue of courage seems to be 
problematically overdetermined by its own history: a history that is populated 
by quite worn and overly masculine clichés as to what a courageous person is 
or a courageous act might look like. Recently, even one of the cultural factories 
of courageous tales, namely Hollywood, started to avoid at least the most ob-
vious of these clichés and modelled some of its protagonists accordingly (into 
morally dubious, often slightly nihilistic anti-heroes). Any attempt to revamp 
courage runs the risk of leading to just another instance of problematic praise 
of the classic grand heroic gestures that were almost always not only coded in 
a masculine fashion but were also, again problematically, mostly militaristic 
in nature. One may think of the pathos linked to facing the greatest threats, 
including death, the ultimate meat axe, for some greater purpose; of the idea 
of having to be ready to risk it all, facing the enemy where it counts, sacrificing 
one’s own life for some greater good. It seems almost impossible to get rid of 
these implications, since already one of the Greek names for courage, namely 
andreia, tellingly not only translates as courage or bravery (as in the brave sol-
dier), but also means manliness, whereby it appears to be an obvious expres-
sion of all the problems inherent in the concept of courage.
1 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 28.
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Courage immediately appears to be the militaristically heroic (and due to the 
history of militaristic heroism, thus masculine) sacrificial virtue par excellence. 
It seems difficult to make a plea for its renaissance. Yet, the American Senator 
from Arizona and well-known Republican John McCain defends the virtue of 
courage for today’s political situation in his 2004 book Why Courage Matters. 
Courage’s virtue appears when “our fear is overcome by our conscience and our 
beliefs and forces us to act.”2 An almost identical claim was made by George W. 
Bush a few years earlier and repeated by Rudy Giuliani in the face of the 9/11 
attacks. The latter also explicitly referred to Winston Churchill’s classification 
of courage as the first of all civic virtues. These appraisals of courage as the 
classic civic virtue are an unacknowledged – and perhaps even unintended – 
resumption of Aristotle’s claim from the Nicomachean Ethics that courage is 
the virtue that provides the measure to all other virtues. This definition, high-
ly influential on its own, gained even more explicit political impact with John 
Locke’s reformulation stating that courage is the “guard and support of all oth-
er virtues” in the face of “pain, disgrace, and poverty.”3 Should one not take 
this as a symptom of the still prominent Aristotelianism linked to the concept of 
courage that also causes all the resistances that this concept of courage gener-
ates? To answer this question, it is instructive to first return to Aristotle – whom 
one can certainly not reproach for having been a US Republican.
 
Aristotle gives, as always, a refined definition of courage in the ninth chapter 
of his Nicomachean Ethics, where he first classifies courage as a virtue,4 and 
virtue, as is well known, is formally defined as the middle between two ex-
tremes. A virtue is what measures two extremes by balancing them with one 
another. Measured and measurable extremes are thus due to virtue no longer 
too extreme. Virtue for Aristotle is thus essentially measurement, Maßnahme. 
This also holds for the virtue of courage. Aristotle claims that “in fear and con-
fidence, courage is the middle.”5 Courage is located in between what makes us 
afraid and our own self-confidence, so that the courageous neither have too 
much nor too little confidence, nor too much nor too little fear. He subsequently 
specifies that courage does not describe confronting all kinds of things that we 
2 John McCain, Why Courage Matters: The Way to A Braver Life, Random House, New York 
2004, p. 24. 
3 John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, Hackett, Indianapolis 1996, p. 86.
4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, 1108b, 34f. 
5 Ibid., 1170b, 32.
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might fear, but rather is the virtuous handling of very specific fearsome objects. 
For there are, first, things we might fear but such fear is not rational. These 
things are irrelevant for courage as a virtue – since a virtue can only be a virtue 
if it is something a rational being has. Non-rational beings, say animals, are 
not virtuous. Then, second, there are things that one cannot but fear and it is 
rational to do so, yet it is not at all virtuous to confront them. Some things make 
us ashamed in the eyes of others and therefore we certainly and rationally are 
afraid of them, yet it makes no sense for Aristotle to confront them confidently. 
Since committing shameful acts has nothing to do with virtue: Shameful acts 
are themselves an extreme and thus cannot coincide with courage (as it is a 
virtue and balances extremes).
 
Overly extremely confident ways of dealing with what one fears cannot be 
called courageous at all. They rather lead to shamelessness, which obviously 
is not a virtue and has nothing to do with courage. What then are the things 
that courage deals with? The ones we fear but need to confront with the right 
amount of confidence? Aristotle’s first answer – here he is, to speak anachronis-
tically, a Heideggerian – is: death. Death “is the most fearful thing of all […].”6 
But Aristotle specifies again that it is not death as such that is the privileged 
object of courage, not any kind of death. It is certainly rational to fear death. 
Yet, confronting death does not imply courage in all cases. Because courage 
does not simply entail confronting whatever one fears most. If I do things that it 
is rational to fear but my reasons for doing so are stupid, I am not courageous, 
but stupid. Aristotle describes this as foolhardiness: For the rash person is he 
“who exceeds in confidence,” but, Aristotle continues, who “is also a boaster 
and a pretender to courage,”7 who tries to appear courageous but is not. This 
implies that foolhardiness can appear as if it were courage but is ultimately 
closer to cowardice.
 
So, the privileged object of courage is death, not any kind of death, but one 
linked to the right and that is: rational reasons for confronting it. For Aristotle 
this means that it must be a death that is linked to honour: “the most noble […] 
are deaths in battle, because they take place in the greatest and noblest danger, 
and this fits with the way honours are bestowed in cities and the courts of the 
6 Ibid., 1115a, 49.
7 Ibid., 115b, 50.
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monarchs. So it is the person who does not fear a noble death, or the risk of im-
mediate death, that should really be described as courageous […].”8 The object 
of courage is a death that is confidently confronted for the right – namely ra-
tional – reasons; a death that is confronted because one defends one’s own city 
or country, which if it is a just city or country is the best reason for defending it 
by confronting what one would otherwise avoid. The military confrontation is 
here turned into the paradigm of the courageous act.9 Aristotle claims that the 
courageous person in general and in a military battle in particular is as confi-
dent as a human rational being needs to be but also fears those things that need 
to be feared as they exceed and defeat human power (bullets, for example).
 
Courage is the most rational way of being afraid – while being confident at the 
same time. Its rationality is defined by levelling fear and confidence for the 
right reasons. Virtue in general is, by definition, a quantitative measurement 
for Aristotle, a quantitative equilibrium. Which is why courage as a virtue is 
constituted precisely by the right amount of fear that determines exactly the 
right amount of confidence. Those who lack this adequate measurement, like 
“madmen or [the] insensible,”10 do not fear anything. And those who fear too 
much are cowards. Cowards, madmen, and the insensible do not belong in the 
corps of courageous men because they lack the proper measure. However, the 
courageous person feels the right amount of fear and confronts it with the right 
and rationally measured amount of confidence and thus acts in absolute calm 
(even though sometimes, as Aristotle suggests, anger can help, but only an 
anger that can be transformed into a motivational energy within the virtuous 
framework of courage, as long as rage remains within courage). The courageous 
act is then characterisable as ethically good, whereas its converse (too much 
confidence, too much fear, or too little of either) is ethically bad.
But Aristotle’s ultimate definition of courage adds another component that once 
again specifies this notion. This further component is that one needs knowledge. 
Not any kind of knowledge, but one acquired through practical, i.e. inner-sit-
uational, experience. This means that one can learn and acquire the virtue of 
8 Ibid., 1115a, 49.
9 To be exact, one must add that Aristotle does state that all courageous acts are essentially 
militaristic in nature, but he does state that death on the battlefield is, if it is in defence of 
a just country, the exemplary case of courage. 
10 Ibid., 1115b, 50.
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courage by gaining practical experience in different situations in which one 
fears something and experiences one’s own competence in dealing with these 
things whereby confidence in one’s own capacities (and sometimes even these 
very capacities) is produced. In some sense, courage also springs from learning 
by doing. Courage is a virtue acquired through practical experience whereby 
knowledge of one’s own capacities and their applicability within specific fear-
ful situations is generated. One learns to measure what one is able to do and 
thereby when and how much confidence to have. This confidence is thus linked 
to practical knowledge: We know what we have to fear and why we have to fear 
it and we also know and are conscious of our own capacities, of what we can do. 
It is this knowledge that provides the measure. Courage thus ultimately derives 
from this concatenation of subjective and objective knowledge. Courageous are 
those who from their own subjective experience know what they can do and 
know what they objectively have to fear and how they have to fear it and are 
thus confident to the objectively right degree. Aristotle states this as follows: 
“So the courageous person is the one who endures and fears – and likewise is 
confident about – the right things, for the right reason, in the right way, and at 
the right time; for the courageous person feels and acts in accordance with the 
merits of the case, and as reason requires.”11
So, we here obtain a quite solid definition of courage (and one can see why 
Elias Canetti once called Aristotle a conceptual omnivore12), but it is one that 
fundamentally links courage to a military paradigm since the ultimate object 
of courage is and remains an honourable death for a greater cause which one 
faces because one is confidently aware of and able to measure the relation of 
this object to one’s own capacities. But one may now also see why the quoted 
Republican politicians have adopted this virtue, for it implements ethical her-
oism at the very heart of the political community, as the basic civic virtue on 
which all civic conduct is based. The political community thereby becomes a 
latently heroic one, and a latently masculine one (as all heroes have something: 
adequate knowledge of their capacities and when to invest them and for what). 
A remark by Susan Sontag apropos the 9/11 terrorists – a remark that angered 
many people – can help to depict what is problematic in this definition. She 
argued that “in the matter of courage (a morally neutral virtue): whatever be 
11 Ibid.
12 Cf. Elias Canetti, The Human Province, Seabury Press, New York 1978, p. 33.
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said about Tuesday’s perpetrators, they were no cowards.”13 And Kant in his An-
thropology, as if he foresaw this problem, after Aristotle – and precisely there-
fore – introduces a distinction between courage as such and moral courage; 
only the latter is derived from genuinely moral principles that do not exist for 
he or she who acts just courageously.14 So, Kant here clearly saw the problem – 
which he is usually accused of neglecting – between the form and the content 
(of courage).15 In any case, Sontag’s comment complicates the Aristotelian ren-
dering of courage as a virtue (and forces one to be even more specific). This 
happens not only because her remark could only be perceived as an affront to a 
certain American Republican understanding of courage, but worse: because it 
fits this understanding on a purely formal level all-too well.
 
If one takes this more or less contemporary American Republican defence of 
courage seriously for a moment and reads it as a kind of representative para-
digm for how to conceive courage, the reasons are obvious why it seems con-
troversial, to say the least, to return to courage today (at least if you are not 
an American Republican). If one starts with the McCain-Aristotle model, there 
are four options at hand as to what to do: Either one nonetheless attempts an 
Aristotelian-Republican defence of courage, arguing why it is right even when 
it seems to come with some problematic implications, or one attempts a non-Ar-
istotelian but still Republican account, or an Aristotelian but non-Republican 
account of courage (emphasising how the Republicans got it wrong), or finally 
one attempts to unpack a non-Aristotelian and non-Republican account of cour-
age. What follows is an attempt to opt for the last of these possible options. In 
principle, I side with those feminist critics of the so-called new “Manly Men”16 
and of the(ir) idea of courage that turns the latter into a conceptually male and 
military virtue (even though my reasons may in part differ from theirs). But I 
13 Susan Sontag, “Talk of the Town”, The New Yorker (24 September 2001), p. 32. That cour-
age is useful but can also be destructive (that it is thus a morally neutral virtue) has also 
been argued by Shklar. Cf. Judith N. Shklar, The “Liberalism of Fear”, in: Political Thought 
and Political Thinkers, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1998, pp. 3–20.
14 Yet, one may say that Aristotle prevents this confusion by emphasising that only he or she 
is properly courageous who confronts death for the right reasons (that is, for defending a 
just city and not just any city or community). 
15 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2006, pp. 156ff.
16 Patricia Leigh Brown, “Heavy Lifting Required: The Return of the Manly Men”, in: The New 
York Times (28 October 2001).
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fundamentally concede that one needs to conceive of what Wendy Brown called 
a “post-masculinist courage,”17 or: feminine courage.       
II. Philosophy and Courage, I
How to liberate courage from Republicanism (the American style at least) and 
the Aristotelian rendering that I reconstructed briefly? My methodological intu-
ition is the following: To do this one has to separate courage from the concept of 
virtue. For it is virtue that provides the link between American Republicanism 
that is closet (and perhaps trivialised) Aristotelianism and the Aristotelianism 
that leads to (not so closet) heroic militarism. If there is any value to rethinking 
courage today, it can only be done by undoing this very concatenation that is 
held together by the concept of virtue. So, courage not as  – and without all – 
virtue. What could this mean? With the Aristotelian-Republican model one has 
more than nothing at hand to proceed with: One can use this model as a neg-
ative matrix of all the things that one has to reshuffle, remodel, and avoid. Re-
thinking courage must therefore also imply separating courage from its relation 
to knowledge. Courage can no longer name the appropriately measured evalua-
tion of practical actions that spring from the knowledge of one’s own capacities 
in relation to an appropriately known and evaluated situation of justified and 
justifiable fear. There certainly must still be a relation of courage to something 
like fear, but it cannot be an objective(ly measurable) fear, not a fear for good 
reasons that one knows of and about, and that would allow one to evaluate in 
advance how to practically deal with it.
 
Courage’s measure is not given. Rather, it is what is at stake or in question. But 
what can courage be if it is neither a virtue nor anchored in an objective knowl-
edge of what we fear and what we are able to do. I will only be able to unfold a 
sketch of some of the constitutive elements of an answer here. Proceeding via 
negativa and in a rather abstract manner, I can nonetheless indicate the follow-
ing: If courage is not considered to be a virtue, it has to be conceptualised as 
a specific kind of operation. This operation cannot be derived from an already 
constituted knowledge or given capacities. This means that in and with courage 
there must be a different relation to knowledge at stake. As Nietzsche once pro-
17 Wendy Brown, Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Theory, Rowman and 
Littlefield, Totowa 1988, pp. 205–206. 
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claimed: “Only very late, one has the courage to assume that which one knew 
all along”18 – pointing to a knowledge that we do not know we have – which is 
at the same time the shortest definition that Freud gave of the unconscious. This 
means that courage implies a different relation to knowledge or a different kind 
of knowledge; maybe one can even state that courage must be located against 
the background of the distinction between knowledge and truth famously propa-
gated by Heidegger, Lacan, and others. Courage in this different meaning would 
entail the activation of a different relation to a different kind of knowledge, or to 
recall the title of Michel Foucault’s last lecture at the Collège de France, to which 
I will return subsequently, it would also entail courage to truth.19 The general 
plan is thus: One replaces the concatenation of courage and knowledge – which 
is constitutive of the idea of courage being a virtue – in Aristotle with a concat-
enation of courage and truth. The operation of courage could not be conceived 
of as being derived from or from applying a given objective knowledge, because 
this would consider both as being already given (in the form of capacities and 
as objects that I fear). In conceptualising courage as a specific kind of operation 
one thus shifts the terrain: One will no longer speak of the objective knowledge 
of things already given, but rather refer to an operation involved in the becom-
ing of subjects, in an operation that is a crucial component of subjectivisation.
 
In other words, courage is not an operation related to the being of already giv-
en subjects and objects, but rather to what is not or not yet. A courage not of 
what is but of what takes place, of what happens and might ultimately pro-
duce – as its material effect – subjects. Courage would then not be a virtue, but 
a kind of risky anticipatory reception of something that happens, (paradoxi-
cally perhaps) forming the very condition of possibility of it happening at all; 
an operation of identifying that there is something taking place as something 
taking place, which consequently forces one to assume that one already made 
a decision.20 Courage lies in assuming that something has already happened.21 
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente. 1885–1887, in: Kritische Studienausgabe, 
Vol. 12, de Gruyter, Berlin 1989, p. 407.
19 Michael Foucault, The Courage to the Truth (The Government of the Self and Others II). 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983, Palgrave, London 2001.
20 Courage may then, for example, lie in identifying that one has fallen in love as something 
that happened to oneself.
21 This is why there is even a link between courage and a certain kind of fatalism. For the 
latter, cf. Frank Ruda, Abolishing Freedom: A Plea for a Contemporary Use of Fatalism, 
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Courage then also means assuming the responsibility for a decision that one 
did not consciously make, but that no one but oneself is responsible for, as it is 
a decision that makes one into who one is. Courage then is, to just in passing 
use the vocabulary of Alain Badiou, neither an event nor already the practice of 
a subject (thus it still could be a virtue); it is rather the operation that identifies 
an event as an event and is thus constitutive (or sometimes also reconstitutive) 
of a subject. Due to the fact that, for Badiou, any event appears in the form of 
a yes/no decision may also clarify why the operation of courage is internally 
linked to what Freud called condensation, namely a condensation of all given 
difference to an unavoidable A or Non-A choice, whereby one already made the 
choice that there is only this choice – the choice that there is only this choice, 
this identificatory gesture would be courageous. This might then also be close 
to what Nietzsche called in a note from 1870 “the courage to experience won-
ders (Muth Wunder zu erleben).”22 
To more systematically return to the anti-Aristotelian matrix that develops by 
negating the fundamental coordinates of Aristotle’s account, one can resume 
the task of what needs to be systematically demonstrated by recourse to a series 
of oppositions: Courage is not a virtue but an operation; it is not inferable from 
knowledge but pertains to the activation of a different kind of knowledge. Or: It 
is not objective knowledge but subjective truth; it is not objective knowledge of 
something given, but related to something that happens and thereby to the con-
stitution of subjects. One last element also and necessarily has to be inscribed 
into this abstract picture of a different notion of courage, and this element may 
actually be the most fundamental one: To distance courage from virtue, it is 
imperative to also account for yet another conceptual difference, namely the 
difference between fear and anxiety. Fear is always, as already Heidegger elab-
orated,23 something that occurs in relation to an object (and thus can be known 
and communicated, in the form of: “I am afraid of frogs because they are so 
greasy,” or something comparable). Anxiety, on the other hand, does not have 
Nebraska University Press, Lincoln, NB 2016.
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente. 1869–1874, in: Kritische Studienausgabe, 
Vol. 7, de Gruyter, Berlin 1989, p. 49.
23 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Harper & Row, New York 2008, pp. 184–191. Hei-
degger states that the “They”, thus everyone absorbed by everyday practices, will never 
get to the point of allowing anxiety as it always already disciplined it so that it corresponds 
to an object in the world (and is thus turned into fear).
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an object in this sense of the term. Heidegger was the first to insist that anxiety 
does not have an object of the world as its cause – and in Being and Time he 
emphasised that one needs the “courage to be anxious [Mut zur Angst]” to see 
the fundamental distinction between fear and anxiety. For Heidegger, anxiety 
is without any external causation and concerns the world as such – and the 
world is not an object but the very frame of and for objects to appear (whereby 
anxiety ultimately turns into a precondition for a proper Entschlossenheit, or: 
freedom). As is well-known, Lacan modified this Heideggerian account slight-
ly, adding that anxiety does indeed not have an object in the mentioned sense 
of the term, but that it is at the same time not without object24: l’angoisse n’est 
pas sans object. With this, Lacan indicates that even though anxiety does not 
have an object, it is not without (pas sans) an object. That is to say, the object of 
anxiety is a passing (pas-sans) object, something which passes, something that 
indicates a passing, brings something to pass, something that happens (to me).
 
To resume, if one seeks to liberate courage from the male-militaristic account as 
a virtue that one can find in Aristotle, one way of doing so is to investigate what 
it might mean that courage is an operation whose operative domain concerns 
this peculiar not-object, this un-object that is the object of anxiety. The central 
claim to be developed therefore must be: It is not only anxiety that does not 
have an object as also courage does not have an object (contra Aristotle). The 
object of courage is not an honourable death. But courage is also not without 
an object: There is no courage without quelque chose qui se passe ou qui s’est 
passé, without something passing. Courage, to give a preliminary or anticipa-
tory definition, would then be a working on and with anxiety and its peculiar 
object, between condensing and dispersing its intensity, trying to find and nev-
er simply having the proper measure of how close it should get to be liberating 
and of how far away it should be so as not to be too incapacitating. And thus 
the difficult questions are: What is a measure that is constitutively operational 
and subjective, yet not quantitative? Or: Is there and can there be a measure of 
how to work with anxiety that nonetheless exceeds knowledge? All these deter-
minations of a different notion of courage are gained by means of negation and 
are (not only) therefore highly speculative. How and where to find a positive 
elaboration of such a different account of courage? 
24 Jacques Lacan, Anxiety. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, Polity Press, Cambridge/
Malden 2014, pp. 69ff.
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II: Philosophy and Courage, II
Some clichés are hard to avoid (as there is truth in them). And it cannot but 
sound clichéd to state that there is a kind of practice that has always declared 
that it stands in an intimate relationship with courage, namely philosophy. 
However convincing one may find this self-description, one can at least as-
sume that by exploring their link what may emerge is a positive manner of 
understanding courage that differs from the Aristotelian picture – and one can 
then see if one finds this more or less enticing or problematic. Philosophy as 
practice does seem to be, at least sometimes, less manly and, at least some-
times, less militaristic than the practice of courage introduced by Aristotle. So, 
does philosophy presents us with a courage of a different, non-militaristic sort? 
What is that kind of courage (if it is such)? I will proceed in two steps: Does 
philosophy really have an intimate relationship to and with courage and what 
is that relationship?
 
The history of modern philosophy is prominently inhabited by references to 
courage: In Descartes’ last published book, the The Passions of the Soul, the 
philosopher states that only a kind of courage – which he calls courageous gen-
erosity– can free us from the indecisions that are symptoms of a misconception 
of freedom. Only courage can ensure the proper use of our rational capacities, 
i.e. of thinking.25 After Descartes, Kant famously deemed the enlightenment 
project to revolve around the “courage to use your own understanding,”26 Sa-
pere aude, implying that without courage we do not act as the ones we are (sup-
posed to be). After Kant, Hegel stated that “the courage of truth, faith in the pow-
er of spirit, is the first condition of philosophical study,”27 and at another place 
remarks that it implies a constitutive kind of passivity, a courage thus needed 
to follow “the inner necessity that is stronger than the subject, by which his 
spirit is then driven without rest […] the impulse of reason [...].”28 After Hegel, 
25 René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, in: The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes, 
Cambridge University Press, New York 1985, p. 380.
26 Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”, in: Political Writings, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2003, p. 54. 
27 G.W.F. Hegel, “Konzept der Rede beim Antritt des philosophischen Lehramtes an der Uni-
versität Berlin”, in: Werke, Vol. 10, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p. 404.
28 Ibid., p. 22.
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Kierkegaard once hailed courage as being “the only measure in life”29: We do 
not know what a life is worth without those acts in which we put everything at 
stake that is dear to us in a leap of faith that provides us with a measure of how 
to live. After Kierkegaard, Heidegger argued for the liberating effects of anxiety 
and referred to a necessary “courage for anxiety”30 that is needed to overcome 
the spontaneous ideology of everyday life. After Heidegger, Alain Badiou noted 
that “any philosophy is determined by the definition it gives of courage.”31
 
If there is a link between courage and philosophy and if there is no philosophy 
without a concept of courage (which is obviously the stronger claim), then the 
courage displayed in philosophical articulation must be essentially different 
than the virtue of courage that comes with militaristic implications. To show 
why that is, it is instructive to quickly turn to the last lecture series that Michel 
Foucault held 1983/4 at the Collège de France, as it addresses the courage to 
truth. Foucault investigates “the conditions and forms”32 by means of which a 
true discourse, whose paradigm is philosophy, historically constitutes itself: 
Any discourse that seeks to claim to be a true discourse relies on a series of 
what one might call indifferentiations, of different operations of becoming in-
different: 1. A discourse articulating truth must be indifferent as to whom it is 
addressed to. Even though it is constitutive that someone is addressed, he or 
she must be an indifferent addressee. This indifferentiation leads to a struc-
tural equality of the addressee. Anyone, whoever he or she may be, is equally 
addressed by this kind of discourse. 2. It must be indifferent to the context in 
which it is articulated. This indifferentiation subtracts the true discourse from 
all historical, institutional, social, and objective settings. Truth can only be ar-
ticulated out of context, not objectively but subjectively. 3. It must be indifferent 
to the consequences that this articulation may yield. This is an indifferentiation 
to the objective setting in which one says the truth and to whatever follows from 
29 There is no such claim, to the best of my knowledge, in Kierkegaard, but there is an ongo-
ing rumour that he mentioned this even several times. 
30 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 298.
31 Alain Badiou, L’antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein (1993–1994), at: http://www.entretemps.
asso.fr/Badiou/93-94.htm. Heidegger, here siding with Badiou, even goes so far as to state 
that a lack of courage leads to a lack of philosophy and to “the clear and inherent stunted 
growth of the liberal arts ‘faculty’ everywhere [...].” Martin Heidegger, Contributions to 
Philosophy (From Enowing), Bloomington, Indiana 2000, p. 106.
32 Foucault, Courage to the Truth, p. 2.
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this articulation. Socrates is an example of this. 4. It must be indifferent to the 
specific ways truth is articulated. This is an indifferentiation with regard to the 
very means employed in the truth-articulation. It is never about the words, it is 
about the things (in) themselves.33
 
Foucault states that “the access to truth demands the transformation of the 
subject”34 – and this transformation is precisely in-formed by this series of in-
differentiations (the indifference to the addressee, to the context, to the con-
sequences, to the ways in which it is brought about). And Foucault notes that 
it is precisely these acts of indifferentiation that demand courage. Courage is 
needed to perform this fourfold subtraction of address, context, consequences, 
and ways of speaking, or more specifically: The articulation of truth lies in this 
kind of subtraction, that is, in a subtraction that ultimately also leads to a con-
centration, a condensation of truth in language that practically brings it forth. 
Everything is subtracted such that in the very discourse that articulates truth, 
truth is condensed. Foucault then also – rather implicitly than explicitly – sug-
gests how these types of subtractive indifferentiations can be measured. One 
can only say and bring forth the truth under the following condition (which 
provides the measure for differentiating between different types of discours-
es): having the courage “to say all the bad things [one is] thinking.”35 In short, 
one must always be ready to say the worst. This is my own slight reformulation 
of Foucault’s claim (concerning the measuring condition of philosophy): One 
must always be ready to assume the worst. Or more precisely: One must always 
already assume the worst – and this takes courage. But it is also the precondi-
tion for thinking, not only for thinking differently, but for thinking in general. 
So, if in Foucault courage names the specific philosophical alignment of indif-
ferentiating operations (it takes courage to perform all these indifferentiations), 
the only way to perform them is to always already assume the worst.
Why should courage consist in assuming and possibly saying the worst and that 
only under this condition – of something like an absolute indifferentiation – 
is one actually able to say the truth and thus do philosophy? Does this turn 
33 These types are more or less distinguished in the first two hundred pages of the above-
mentioned book.
34 Ibid., p. 139.
35 Ibid., p. 130.
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courage into another kind of virtue? Here, at the end, Hegel can help. He speaks 
of a courage that is constitutive not only of philosophy but of any kind of think-
ing. Thought needs what he calls “the will and courage for the truth.”36 And at 
the very beginning – actually, before its proper beginning – one finds in his Sci-
ence of Logic a similar claim: There is an implicit and hidden, yet constitutive 
and crucial, reference to courage before the book even properly begins, a book 
that claims no less than to depict from within the immanence of thought what 
happens in the creation of the world and with the advent of (the conditions of) 
history.37 The Logic, as he states, is “the exposition of God as he is in his eternal 
essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit.” So, Hegel speaks of 
courage in a book that places itself in a position before the creation of the world – 
and is this is not assuming the worst? That there is no world to which we can 
refer or on which we can rely? For Hegel, this is the precondition for elaborating 
what he wants to present: freedom. And it thus takes courage to start from such 
an absolute indifferentiation. But before Hegel begins his actual conceptual ex-
position, he states that something extraordinary happened, namely Kant.
 
Kant founded (or re-founded) philosophy because he demonstrated that there 
is and can only be philosophy if it overcomes all kinds of dogmatisms and un-
justifiable beliefs, and is at the same time able to stand firm against the dangers 
of scepticism and indifferentism. Philosophy has to do with reason alone. Yet, 
Kant failed to derive a proper philosophy from this idea. Hegel gives a surpris-
ing depiction of what Kant achieved. He states that “critical philosophy did in-
deed already turn metaphysics into logic, but, like subsequent idealism, it gave 
to the logical determinations an essentially subjective significance out of an 
anxiety of the object [Angst vor dem Objekt] […].”38 Usually, this is read as proof 
that Hegel is attacking Kant’s subjectivism. Yet, one rarely considers why, for 
Hegel, Kantian philosophy regresses to such a subjective standpoint, namely 
due to anxiety: Kant was anxious in the face of the object of thought. What 
36 G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusätze). Part I of the Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophical Sciences, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis 1991, p. 5.
37 Famously, Hegel states that The Science of Logic is “the exposition of God as he is in his 
eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit.” G.W.F. Hegel, The Science 
of Logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, p. 29) – which also implies that the 
end must also give an account of the creation of nature and of finite spirit and that at its 
end this creation will reach an end. 
38 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 30, translation modified.
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happened with Kant was a true novelty, because Kant was the first to intro-
duce anxiety proper into philosophy,39 the first to feel anxious with regard to 
the proper object of thought. Hegel’s formula is in this sense an accolade; he 
credits Kant for being the first anxious philosopher. Yet, Kant was not coura-
geous. He did not have what one must have as a thinker of the Enlightenment. 
This is the reason why one can claim that for Hegel there is not much to revisit 
or rescue in Kant, apart from this very introduction of anxiety and the peculiar 
object it comes with. One may forget Kant, but one should never forget what he 
did for and to philosophy in terms of anxiety.
 
That is to say, after Kant one must have the courage to think what Kant discov-
ered, but also what he shied away from. That is to say, the first step is to concep-
tually re-introduce anxiety, not only into philosophy (where it is also certainly 
needed), but into thought in general. A re-introduction that will allow one to 
distinguish between two different types of objects, to split the objective realm 
and the realm of objectivity. But this is only the first step. One is also in need 
of courage to think that object which is different from all other objects. What 
to do with this? Hegel suggests that the only thing one can do with regard to 
this object, the passing object of thought, is to “set aside every reflection, [and] 
simply […] take up what is there before us.”40 In German, this is aufnehmen, 
not aufheben. And what is there before us? Hegel again: “There is only present 
the resolve, which can also be viewed as arbitrary, of considering thinking as 
such.”41 It is a resolve that produces anxiety, a resolve that one has never con-
sciously adopted but has nonetheless explored what this means, indifferent to 
all context (the world does not exist anyhow). Love is a good example – and it 
is not an accident that one finds in Lacan’s seminar on anxiety a whole session 
on love.42 Nobody decides to fall in love. It is decided for us in us and then we 
can see what follows from such a decision. It takes courage to assume, to take 
up a decision that one did not make consciously or voluntarily as an orientation 
in one’s life. This also points to a possible re-definition of courage. It means to 
explore the consequences of and, that is, to be responsible for what one has 
never consciously decided but which is nonetheless a decision that has been 
39 He thereby has demonstrated that the save distance of philosophy to its object cannot be 
uphold. 
40 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 47.
41 Ibid., p. 48.
42 Lacan, Anxiety, pp. 170–181.
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taken, like a Neurosenwahl, a choice of neurosis, in Freud – and in this case, 
even contra Hegel – also like what Kant calls the primordial choice of charac-
ter. Courage might need to be courage in the face of such impossible choices, of 
operations that entail in a condensed manner – and that condense – the kernel 
of subjectivity. Even though their appearance cannot but produce anxiety, they 
are nonetheless constitutive of the subject and the world. And courage may be 
needed to think them. A courage of the hopeless, a courage of fatalists, or fem-
inine courage. 
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